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Abstract 
This paper describes the information security attributes of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability, and then uses these to determine the security requirements for ETP. It 
briefly describes the four published UK ETP models (from Flexiscript, Phamacy2U, 
Salford and Transcript) and evaluates these from the perspectives of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Deficiencies, from a security perspective, in the 3 UK ETP 
pilot models (from Flexiscript, Phamacy2U, and Transcript) are described. Possible 
solutions to these deficiencies, as implemented in the Salford model, are described.  
Introduction 
Information security is traditionally viewed as providing confidentiality, integrity and 
availability – the CIA – of electronic data.  
 
Data confidentiality means that only authorised people are allowed to access the 
electronic data. By “access” we mean any type of access to the data; not only the 
ability to read the data, but also the ability to update the data, delete the data or 
execute the data (assuming the electronic data is a program). Conversely, data 
confidentiality requires that unauthorised people are not allowed to access the data in 
an unauthorised manner. Computer security mechanisms that are used to provide data 
confidentiality are:  
- user authentication, whereby the computer can reliability determine who 
the accessing user is,  
- access control, whereby the computer only allows a subset of users to 
access the data in predefined ways, and 
- encryption, whereby the data is enciphered by the computer using an 
encryption key, so that only people or entities with the correct decryption 
key are able to decipher and access the data. 
 
Integrity refers to not only “data integrity” i.e. that the data has not been tampered 
with since its creation by its author, but also to “origin integrity” i.e. that the data 
really did originate from the person who is claiming to have created it, and did not 
come from an impostor. Computer security mechanisms that underpin data and origin 
integrity are based on calculating a cryptographic checksum that is in some way 
bound to the data and to the originator. Thus if the recipient can reliably recalculate 
the checksum, using the received data and knowledge about who the supposed 
originator is, then the recipient can validate the integrity of the received data. 
 
Availability means that the electronic data is available to the authorised users 
whenever and wherever they need to access it. Data availability is often crucial. 
Unavailability can in many instances be worse than having access to partially 
corrupted data or providing compromised access to the data. Implicit in the concept of 
availability are the quality attributes of reliability, scalability and performance. Lack 
of availability can be due to the unreliability of the equipment storing the data, bugs in 
the software used to access the data, disruption of the supporting services such as 
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power or water needed to keep the equipment operational, or failure of humans 
operating the system or the supporting services. Human error is often the biggest 
cause of unavailability. Adequate performance is necessary when accessing the data 
in order to stop humans becoming frustrated with the system or unable to perform 
their tasks efficiently or effectively. Steadily worsening performance will eventually 
lead to complete unavailability of a system. If systems are not scalable to the levels 
required, this may lead to worsening performance as the system becomes saturated, 
and in the worst case, to a complete cessation of service. Denial of service attacks are 
specifically aimed at removing availability, by saturating a system so that it is unable 
to provide a normal level of service. 
 
Finally, it should be stated that it is impossible to achieve absolute security of 
electronic information, just as it is impossible to guarantee that a house can never be 
burgled, a bank robbed, or a car stolen. Generally speaking, the more you are prepared 
to pay for information security, the more secure you can make your information. But 
it is a law of diminishing returns. Consequently, the strength of security applied to 
electronic information should be in proportion to its value, and to the potential cost of 
losing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information that is being 
secured. Ultimately, determining the level of information security to provide is a 
business and political decision. 
Applying CIA to ETP 
When we consider the implications of applying (or not applying) confidentiality, 
integrity and availability to the electronic transfer of prescriptions (ETP), it reveals a 
number of system requirements. 
 
Considering confidentiality first, there are a number of legal and ethical obligations 
placed on the medical professional to protect the confidentiality of patient 
information. The 1998 Data Protection Act [1] requires that personal data be protected 
against unauthorized or unlawful processing. The NHS Confidentiality Code of 
Practice [2] requires that all NHS staff must keep patient information private, and 
physically and electronically secure. Since electronic prescriptions contain patient 
information, the implications of these obligations for ETP are that: 
- only qualified and authorised prescribers should be allowed to create 
electronic prescriptions for patients,   
- electronic prescriptions should be encrypted during transfer so that 
unauthorised people cannot view their contents, and 
- only qualified and authorised dispensers should be able to retrieve 
electronic prescriptions ready for dispensing to patients. 
However, not all authorised dispensers should be able to retrieve all genuine 
electronic prescriptions, since this would violate a principle of the Caldicott report [3] 
which states “Access to patient identifiable information should be on a strict need to know 
basis.” Thus we have another requirement: 
- only the qualified dispenser chosen by the patient or his proxy should be 
able to access the patient’s electronic prescription.  
This later requirement poses a significant problem for ETP, namely, how should an 
electronic prescription be electronically protected so that any dispenser has the 
potential to access it, but only the dispenser chosen by the patient or his proxy can 
actually access it. As we will see later, the four ETP systems designed in the UK have 
chosen to address this critical requirement in different ways. 
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Turning now to consider integrity, all prescribers i.e. GPs, dentists, prescribing nurses 
etc. need to be unambiguously bound to the electronic prescriptions that they create. 
This will allow any authorised person to check who issued a particular prescription, 
and whether the prescription has been tampered with or not since creation. Before 
dispensing, pharmacists need to be confident that: 
- each electronic prescription really did originate from a qualified and 
authorised prescriber, 
- each prescription is valid i.e. it is not accidentally corrupted in any way, or 
even purposefully tampered with or a complete fake,  
- each prescription is an original i.e. not a duplicate of a previously valid 
prescription, and 
- each prescription has not previously been dispensed.  
Prescription duplication, or multiple dispensations, especially in the case of controlled 
drugs, could allow a patient to obtain multiple doses of a highly restricted medication.  
 
Unauthorised duplication of digital data poses a particular problem for computer 
scientists, since a binary copy cannot be distinguished from its digital original, as they 
both comprise the same sequence of binary digits. The method usually used to protect 
against data duplication during computer communications, is to uniquely identify each 
data message and then make the receiving software discard second and subsequent 
copies when it receives multiple copies of a message. Thus any ETP system should be 
able to detect duplicate, corrupted, fake and previously dispensed prescriptions, and 
not be willing to process them. Unfortunately we currently don’t have any technology 
that is able to reliably and in all cases differentiate between maliciously altered digital 
data on the one hand and genuine digital data that was incorrectly created or 
accidentally corrupted on the other hand. Thus electronic prescribing and ETP 
software has to be carefully designed to both minimise the chances of users making 
mistakes during electronic prescription creation, and to stop corrupted, duplicate or 
incorrect prescriptions from being transferred and/or dispensed. 
 
Considering availability, the ETP system obviously needs to be extremely reliable. 
Since people’s comfort and quality of life, and in extreme cases their very life itself, 
may well depend upon the availability of medication when needed, availability of the 
ETP system is perhaps the most important of the three security elements to consider. 
However, no one has ever created a 100% reliable system, nor is anyone likely to in 
the near future. Therefore to minimise the chances of a complete system failure, ETP 
system designers need to ensure that their designs do not contain any single points of 
failure, but rather have alternate or multiple servers for all critical system components. 
Furthermore, there needs to be a fallback mechanism that is able to take over when 
(components of) the ETP system fail, either in whole or in part due to ETP hardware 
or software failures, or failure of the supporting services such as the power or 
communications networks that ETP relies upon. In addition, ETP systems designers 
need to ensure that their designs are scalable to national proportions, whilst 
maintaining adequate performance for all participants. We have found in our previous 
research [15] that this last factor is extremely important for busy health care 
professionals such as GPs, whose time is at a premium. Perhaps of less importance, 
but still worthy of consideration under the topic of availability, is to ensure that the 
ETP system does not “loose” any of the electronic prescriptions that have been 
 4
entrusted to it, or if in the rare cases when it does, we have an easy mechanism to 
allow prescribers to re-introduce “lost” electronic prescriptions back into the system. 
UK ETP Systems 
There were three different ETP pilot systems that underwent live trials by the UK 
NHS during 2001-3. These were provided by the Transcript Consortium, the 
Pharmacy 2U Consortium, and the SchlumbergerSema Consortium. A fourth system 
was developed at the University of Salford during 2000-3, and this underwent 
laboratory trials and focus group evaluation. The 3 UK ETP Pilots officially ended on 
the 30th June 2003 [4], and the Salford project finished in September 2003. The four 
ETP models are described below. Note that evaluation of the 3 UK ETP pilots [6] 
determined that none of the 3 pilot models was good enough to build a national 
system from, and that a Common Model should be developed based upon the 
experiences gained. Since the Common Model was not available for analysis when 
this paper was written, we concentrate on evaluating the 4 published models from a 
CIA perspective. We believe this is still valuable, and can be extended to the 
Common Model once it has been finalised and published. 
The Transcript Consortium Model 
Within the Transcript Consortium model [11] (see figure 1) a prescriber generates a 
prescription for her patient, digitally signs it, and prints it out as a 2-D barcode on a  
paper prescription.  An encrypted electronic version is sent directly to the PPA. 
 
The patient takes the 2-D barcoded prescription to any pharmacy of their choice. The 
pharmacist scans in the barcode, validates the digitally signed prescription, dispenses 
the drugs and then generates a dispensed message and sends it to the PPA.  
  
 
Figure 1: Transcript consortium model 
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For repeat prescriptions patients are asked to nominate a pharmacy of their choice, 
and the prescriptions are sent directly there by email, encrypted for the pharmacy. 
After dispensation the pharmacist sends a dispensed message to the PPA.  The PPA 
uses the messages they have received from the pharmacy to effect payment to it, and 
from the GP to feed back prescribing information. 
The Pharmacy2U Consortium Model 
The Pharmacy2U Consortium model [12] relies solely on direct prescription 
messaging to patient designated Pharmacists (see figure 2).  The patient visits their 
GP and at the end of the consultation is asked which pharmacy they wish to have 
dispense their prescription drugs.  The GP then digitally signs the prescription, and 
sends it directly to the chosen pharmacy, encrypted with a key for the pharmacy. All 
pharmacists in the pharmacy share the same key, so any pharmacist is able to decrypt 
the prescription and dispense the drugs. 
 
The patient will either have their prescriptions delivered to their door by home service 
pharmacies and Internet pharmacies, or go into their designated pharmacy and pick up 
their prescription, which should be ready for them on their arrival.  On dispensation 
the pharmacy generates a dispensed message and sends this to the PPA for processing.  
 
The system works in the same way for repeat prescriptions. 
 
The SchlumbergerSema Consortium (Flexiscript) Model 
 
The Schlumberger/Sema Consortium has settled for a relay model (see figure 3) [10] 
called Flexiscript. Prescriber’s send digitally signed electronic prescriptions to a 
prescription data store, encrypted for the data store. An encrypted copy is sent directly 
Figure 2: Pharmacy 2U Consortium model 
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to the PPA. The system also generates a paper prescription containing a unique data 
store identification number for the patient and a barcode representation of the digitally 
signed prescription.  The patient takes the prescription to any pharmacy and the 
pharmacist uses the identification number to retrieve the electronic prescription from 
the data store. The data store decrypts the prescription (this may happen upon arrival 
or when the prescription is requested), and re-encrypts it for the pharmacist upon 
demand. 
 
Patients may phone the pharmacist ahead of arrival, giving them the identification 
number so that the prescription is ready to collect when they arrive. After dispensation 
the pharmacist sends a dispensed message to the PPA.  
 
Repeat prescriptions are handled in exactly the same way as initial prescriptions, so 
that the patient can go to any pharmacy to pick up their repeat prescriptions. 
The Salford Model 
The Salford model [16] is also a relay model (see figure 4). The GP digitally signs the 
electronic prescription and then the prescription is symmetrically encrypted and sent 
to the prescription store. The electronic prescription contains a copy of the symmetric 
key encrypted for the PPA, to allow the PPA to subsequently retrieve and decrypt the 
prescription. The patient is provided with a printed paper copy of the prescription 
containing in addition to the standard contents a reference barcode (which allows fast 
access to the prescription in the prescription store) and a symmetric key barcode 
(which is needed to decrypt the prescription in the store). The patient then goes to his 
pharmacy of choice and hands over his prescription, which allows the pharmacist to 
retrieve and decrypt the electronic prescription from the prescription store. The 
dispensed prescription (which may be endorsed) is encrypted for the PPA by the 
 
Figure 3: SchlumbergerSema Consortium model 
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pharmacist and returned to the prescription store. Periodically the PPA will retrieve 
dispensed and expired un-dispensed prescriptions from the prescription store. 
 
If a patient has a preferred pharmacy and informs the GP about this, then an email 
message is sent to this pharmacy, encrypted for the pharmacy, containing the 
reference barcode and symmetric key barcode. This allows the pharmacy to retrieve 
the prescription from the prescription store prior to the patient’s arrival, and to 
dispense the drugs ready for collection. This process can be applied to repeat 
prescriptions as well as acute prescriptions. 
 
Figure 4: University of Salford ETP model 
 
Prescribers’ authorisations to prescribe, and pharmacists’ authorisations to dispense 
are checked automatically by the Salford ETP system [17] before allowing the health 
care professionals to access the ETP system. Similarly patients’ entitlements to free 
prescriptions are similarly checked on behalf of the pharmacist, thus relieving them of 
this burden for the majority of patients.  
Analysing the Four ETP Models 
We now analyse each of the four ETP models from the security perspectives of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
 
There are three aspects of confidentiality that need to be considered, namely: only 
authorised health care professionals should be able to participate in ETP, electronic 
prescriptions should be encrypted during transfer and only the dispenser chosen by the 
patient or his proxy should be able to access the patient’s prescription. None of the 
three UK ETP pilots have an electronic authorisation system built into their models, 
and this is one of the requirements arising from the ETP evaluation report [6], 
 
 “Satisfactory mechanism(s) should be developed for the secure accreditation of GPs, 
registrars, locums, and pharmacies to prevent unauthorised use of the system”  
 
The Salford model does have a high security authorisation system built into its model. 
Authorisations are implemented using the X.509 authorisation framework  [7] and the 
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PERMIS authorisation infrastructure [5]. X.509 is an international standard, which 
besides specifying an authorisation framework also standardises the authentication 
framework (public key certificates, certification authorities etc.) used by all four ETP 
models. We thus believe that it is the perfect framework to use for ETP authorisation, 
since ETP is already using the same standard for the authentication and integrity of its 
electronic prescriptions. PERMIS is an implementation of the X.509 authorisation 
framework, and is internationally distributed as part of the US National Science 
Foundation’s Middleware Initiative software release [8]. PERMIS is shortly to be 
piloted as a national authorisation infrastructure for the UK academic community, and 
therefore we believe it is highly suitable for use in ETP [17]. 
 
Encrypting the electronic prescriptions during transfer is especially difficult to 
achieve if the ETP system is to preserve the confidentiality of the electronic 
prescription and the patient’s freedom of choice to choose a pharmacy right up to the 
point of dispensation. This is because the prescribing GP will not know at the time of 
prescription creation who the final recipient pharmacist is to be, and therefore cannot 
encrypt the prescription for the pharmacist. Consequently the four models have 
addressed this dual problem in different ways.  
 
The Pharmacy2U consortium has chosen to remove patient’s freedom of choice at the 
time of prescribing, and the GP encrypts and emails the prescription to the patient’s 
chosen pharmacy. Thus the patient cannot change their mind after leaving the 
prescriber’s surgery. The SchlumbergerSema (Flexiscript) consortium retains patient 
freedom of choice up to the point of dispensation, but with a small loss of 
confidentiality. The electronic prescription is first encrypted for the central 
prescription store, but is then decrypted by the store, and re-encrypted for the 
pharmacy after the patient has chosen which pharmacy to go to. Thus anyone with 
access to the central store has the potential to view all prescriptions, plus any 
pharmacist has the potential ability to retrieve any and all prescriptions by searching 
for them in the store by trial and error. The Flexiscript implementation has limited this 
last weakness by only giving pharmacists a pre-configured number of erroneous 
attempts before blocking their access to the prescription store [13]. The Transcript 
consortium model is a hybrid. It preserves patient freedom of choice for acute 
prescriptions, by removing the requirement to encrypt them since they are not 
transferred electronically over the network. This model writes the prescription 
unencrypted to a 2-D barcode on the paper script, and anyone with access to the paper 
script can read the contents of the prescription, in much the same way as today. For 
repeat prescriptions the Transcript model removes the patient’s freedom of choice at 
the time of prescribing, by encrypting the prescriptions for the chosen pharmacy (in 
much the same way as the Pharmacy2U model). Only the Salford model preserves 
patient freedom of choice up to the point of dispensation, whilst not compromising the 
confidentiality of the electronic prescription. This is because the electronic 
prescription is symmetrically encrypted using a one off symmetric key, and is sent to 
the prescription store encrypted. Neither the prescription store nor any pharmacist are 
able to decrypt the prescription, as they do not know the key. The key is written 
(within a barcode) to the paper prescription given to the patient, thus only the 
pharmacy chosen by the patient has the ability to decrypt the electronic prescription 
after the patient arrives [9]. For patients who prefer to pre-select a pharmacy, an 
encrypted email is sent to the pharmacy containing the decryption key. 
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Turning now to consider integrity, all four models use digital signatures. A digital 
signature provides a unique cryptographic binding of the contents of an electronic 
document to the private key used to create the digital signature. Thus digital 
signatures provide data integrity and originator integrity, providing the private key 
used to create the digital signature remains in the sole possession of the document 
originator. Originator integrity for a digital signature is thus not quite the same as that 
of a hand written signature, since it is not possible to lend someone your hand, but it is 
possible to lend someone your private key. Originator integrity for a digital signature 
is more akin to that of a bank claiming that money retrieved from a bank account by 
an ATM card must have been withdrawn by the account holder, since the latter should 
have been the only person in possession of the ATM card and the PIN used to activate 
it. Of course, we now know that this is not always the case, due to well publicised 
court cases of ATM withdrawals being made by non-account holders. Thus if 
prescription creators keep their private keys and PINs solely for their own use, we will 
have originator integrity. But if prescribers lend their private keys and PINs to 
colleagues, or they are stolen by someone else, we will not have originator integrity 
(although we should have accountability).  
 
Digital signatures also have the ability to prevent the duplication of electronic 
prescriptions, providing each signed prescription contains a unique number and a 
validity time, and the ETP system ensures that no two identical prescriptions with the 
same unique number can exist during the validity time (note that repeat prescriptions 
are not duplicates and will have different unique numbers). The models that rely on 
relays (the Flexiscript and Salford models) can simply ensure that duplicate 
prescriptions with the same unique number are rejected by the relay.  The acute 
Transcript model relies on detection of paper prescription duplication by the 
pharmacy, but it is very difficult to detect duplicates sent to different pharmacies. The 
Pharmacy2U and Transcript repeat prescription models will have to rely on the 
prescription generation software not to generate duplicate prescription messages, but 
as we all know this is extremely difficult to achieve in practice, since we all do 
occasionally receive duplicate email messages. 
 
Equally as important is the detection of concurrent duplicate dispensations and 
fraudulent claims after dispensation that prescriptions have been lost and never 
dispensed.  The Salford system has mechanisms to prevent both of these scenarios.  
Once a pharmacist retrieves a prescription from the relay, a lock is placed on that 
prescription record, which prevents any other pharmacist from being able to dispense 
the same prescription.  After dispensation a message is sent from the pharmacist to the 
prescriber stating that the prescription has been dispensed preventing a patient 
fraudulently claiming a lost prescription. The Flexiscript model should also be able to 
enforce a lock to prevent concurrent dispensations, but in the pilot service only 2 out 
of the 3 pharmacy systems actually did this [13].  There is insufficient documentation 
in the public domain to determine how the Flexiscript model protects against 
fraudulent claims of lost prescriptions.  The Pharmacy2U and Transcript repeat 
prescription models are (at least partially) protected against fraudulent claims of lost 
prescriptions, since the patient is never given the prescription (although this might not 
stop some patients from claiming that the system has lost their prescriptions).  These 
models also rely on the prescription generation and messaging software not to 
generate duplicate prescription messages, thus eliminating the chance of duplicate 
dispensations. Nevertheless, we believe it would still be a sensible precaution to build 
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duplication checking into the pharmacy software, to ensure that if/when duplicate 
prescription messages are received the duplicates are not dispensed. 
 
Finally we review all four models from the aspect of availability. Factors that need to 
be considered are the existence of single points of failure, how the models cater for 
any failures, and the scalability and performance of the different systems. The 
Flexiscript model has a single prescription store through which all prescriptions are 
relayed. If this fails then the whole ETP system fails [13]. Flexiscript also uses a 
single private key server from which prescribers must download their signing keys 
prior to prescription creation. If this is unavailable then no-one is able to sign and 
send an electronic prescription [13]. Whilst the Salford model also uses a prescription 
store, it has been designed to be configurable, so that any number of prescription 
stores can be used, up to one per prescribing surgery if required. Thus there is no 
reason to have a single point of failure in the Salford model. The Pharmacy2U model 
uses a single directory server to hold all users’ public key certificates, for both 
encrypting messages and validating signatures. If this fails, then new prescriptions 
cannot be sent, and those that have already been sent cannot be validated [13]. The 
Transcript model does not appear to have a single point of failure that would stop the 
whole ETP system from working [13].  
 
How do the models cope with failures in the ETP system or its supporting 
infrastructures? The Flexiscript and Salford models both print additional information 
onto an existing FP10 prescription form. The Transcript model does so for acute 
prescriptions, but not for repeat prescriptions, which are sent directly to the pharmacy 
by email. The Pharmacy2U model always sends prescriptions directly by email.  
 
Any failures occurring in the email system or in the pharmacy end systems of the 
Pharmacy2U or Transcript repeat prescription models will cause the pharmacies to be 
disabled from participating in the prescription process. The pharmacies will not have a 
failsafe system to fall back to.  In the case of the Transcript repeat prescriptions 
model, the patients and the prescribers could fall back to the paper based acute 
prescription model, but at some inconvenience to the patient if the failure occurs after 
the repeat prescription has been sent (but not received) electronically.   
 
Those models that use supplemented FP10 prescription forms (Transcript acute, 
Flexiscript and Salford) do have a failsafe fallback procedure in the case of any and 
all ETP failures – they simply revert to paper based processing. However the 
Transcript and Flexiscript consortia have stated that the use of supplemented FP10 
forms is a short term expedient measure to allow the patient to take his prescription to 
either a pharmacy participating in the ETP pilot or one that is not, and they expect the 
forms to be phased out once ETP is implemented nationally [6, 10,11].  In the case of 
the Salford model, the use of the FP10 form is an explicit permanent design feature 
made for several reasons:  
- firstly the patient sees no difference in procedure when ETP is introduced,  
- secondly, GPs said they liked giving the patient a paper prescription as it 
signalled the end of their session with them [14],  
- thirdly, the enhanced paper prescription can be used throughout the 
transition to ETP, without inconveniencing any of the participants, 
- fourthly, the patient remains free to choose the pharmacist right up to the 
moment of dispensing, and 
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- lastly, the system is resilient to all technology failures since the paper 
prescription provides the ultimate fallback, even in the case of a power cut. 
The authors believe the last two points are important from the perspective of 
availability, since the paper prescription provides for permanent availability of the 
prescription service and flexibility even in the case of complete ETP technology or 
pharmacy failures. 
 
Finally we consider scalability and performance. The performance of the 3 UK pilots 
has been inadequate “The evaluation reports describe shortcomings in performance 
and usability that appear to be caused by inadequate system design or faulty 
implementation” [6]. We recognised very early on that performance would be a 
critical success factor for ETP. We also suspected that the use of XML transfer 
syntax, as mandated by the Department of Health in its ETP XML message DTDs, 
would not be optimal from a performance perspective. Consequently we performed 
some comparative performance tests for XML and ASN.1 BER [21, 22]. ASN.1 is a 
mature international standard used by X.509 public key certificates, encrypted email 
(S/MIME), and mobile phones etc. We found that ASN.1 BER would outperform 
XML by approximately an order of magnitude [18]. Subsequent to this, Sun have also 
published a paper about Fast Web Services [19] that supports our findings. We thus 
believe that the DoH would do well to reconsider the use of XML as the transfer 
syntax for electronic prescriptions. 
 
We are not aware of any scalability tests that have been published by the 3 UK ETP 
pilots. The Flexiscript consortia are the only UK ETP pilot to say that scalability tests 
have been performed, but they would not release these results to the ETP evaluators 
[20]. Salford has performed scalability tests for its central relay, and demonstrated 
that 10 million prescriptions can easily be stored on a modest PC. Additional 
performance results are currently being prepared. The Salford model has been 
designed with scalability in mind, by allowing any number of prescription stores to be 
used, ranging from one central national store to one store per GP surgery. Thus we 
believe that it is infinitely scalable. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have looked at the security requirements for ETP, from the 
perspectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability. We have then described and 
evaluated the four published UK ETP models from these perspectives. We have 
shown that each of the 3 UK ETP pilot models are deficient in one way or another, 
and have shown how the Salford model has attempted to address all the security 
requirements for ETP. We believe that this paper will be valuable as a basis for a 
future evaluation of the Common Model, once it has been finalised and published, so 
as to ensure that it does not suffer from the same deficiencies as the 3 UK ETP pilot 
models. 
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